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ABSTRACT
Groupon has become the latest Internet sensation, provid-
ing daily deals to customers in the form of discount offers for
restaurants, ticketed events, appliances, services, and other
items. We undertake a study of the economics of daily deals
on the web, based on a dataset we compiled by monitoring
Groupon over several weeks. We use our dataset to charac-
terize Groupon deal purchases, and to glean insights about
Groupon’s operational strategy. Our focus is on purchase
incentives. For the primary purchase incentive, price, our
regression model indicates that demand for coupons is rela-
tively inelastic, allowing room for price-based revenue opti-
mization. More interestingly, mining our dataset, we find ev-
idence that Groupon customers are sensitive to other, “soft”,
incentives, e.g., deal scheduling and duration, deal featuring,
and limited inventory. Our analysis points to the importance
of considering incentives other than price in optimizing deal
sites and similar systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Groupon is a website offering various deals-of-the-day, with
localized deals for major geographic markets. It has been
one of the fastest growing Internet sales businesses in his-
tory, with tens of millions of registered users and 2011 sales
expected to exceed 1 billion dollars.
We briefly describe how Groupon works; more relevant
details will be given when we describe our dataset. In each
geographic market, or city, there are one or more deals of
the day. Generally, one deal is the featured deal of the day,
and receives the prominent position on the local Groupon
web site. The deal provides a coupon for some product or
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service at a substantial discount (generally 40-60%) to the
list price. Deals may be available for one or more days.
We use the term size of a deal to represent the number of
coupons sold, and the term revenue of a deal to represent
the number of coupons multiplied by the price per coupon.
Groupon reportedly retains approximately half the revenue
from the discounted coupons, and provides the rest to the
seller. Groupon deals each have a minimum threshold size
that must be reached for the deal to take hold, and sellers
may also set a maximum threshold size to limit the number
of coupons sold.
Groupon represents a change from recent Internet adver-
tising trends. While large-scale e-mail distributions for sale
offers are commonplace (generally in the form of spam) and
coupon sites have long existed on the Internet, Groupon has
achieved notable success with its emphasis on higher quality,
localized deals, as well as its marketing savvy on both sides
of this two-sided market. Understanding its success there-
fore seems worthwhile, and this paper represents a first step.
In this paper, we focus on how what we call “soft incen-
tives” affect the size and revenue of Groupon deals empiri-
cally. To explain what we mean by soft incentives, we note
that, obviously, the primary incentive for customers to buy
is the discount Groupon offers, and naturally we examine the
effect of this discount. However, Groupon also ideally tries
to optimize various other parameters in managing the deals
available, including how aggressively the deal is advertised,
the length of time the deal is available, the days of the week
it is available, and whether the deal is capped to a maximum
number of purchasers. These features of deals can poten-
tially greatly impact customer response, and hence we refer
to these parameter settings collectively as soft incentives.
More generally, we believe that the underlying optimization
of soft incentives, such as scheduling the timing and dura-
tion of offers in a resource-constrained environment, lies at
the heart of several problems in network economics, and the
study of Groupon data provides an interesting setting for
examining the issue in a real-world environment.
This preliminary report should be viewed as a piece of a
much larger project regarding this dataset. In a forthcom-
ing extended paper, we consider additional aspects of the
data, including the predictability of deal sizes and the social
processes that may affect them. The dataset will be made
publicly available for other researchers (after we complete
the extended paper.)
Related Work: To date, there has been little previous
work examining Groupon specifically. Edelman et al. con-
sider the benefits and drawbacks of using Groupon from the
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Figure 1: Cumulative hourly sales for an example deal: $10
for $20 Worth of Authentic Indian Cuisine and Drinks at
Rasoi Indian Kitchen in Washington DC, Mon., 2/21/2011.
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Figure 2: Weekly Groupon revenue and sales (2011).
side of the merchant, modeling whether the advertising and
price discrimination effects can make such discounts prof-
itable [10]. Dholakia polls businesses to determine their ex-
perience of providing a deal with Groupon [9], and Arab-
shahi examines their business model [5]. Several works have
studied other online group buying schemes that arose before
Groupon, and that utilize substantially different dynamic
pricing schemes [4, 12].
2. DATASET
We collected data from Groupon between January 12th
and March 3rd, 2011.1 We monitored – to the best of our
knowledge – all deals offered in 20 different cities during
this period. Our criteria for city selection were population
and geographic distribution. Specifically, our list of cities in-
cludes: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston,
Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York,
Orlando, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose,
Seattle, Tallahassee, Vancouver, and Washington DC. In to-
tal our data set contains statistics for 3729 deals.
Each deal is associated with a basic set of features: the
deal description, the retail and discounted prices, the start
and end dates, the threshold number of sales required for
the deal to be“on”, the number of coupons sold, whether the
deal was available in limited quantities, and if it sold out.
From these basic features we compute further quantities of
interest such as the revenue derived by each deal, the deal
duration, the percentage discount, and so on.
Every deal is also associated with a time-series which mon-
itors two parameters. First, we monitor deal size growth
over time; a representative time-series for a deal is shown
in Figure 1. Second, we are interested on whether a par-
ticular deal was “featured” among other deals running con-
currently in the same city. Featured deals are presented
prominently in the webpage associated with the associated
city. For example, visiting groupon.com/boston, one no-
tices that a single deal occupies a significant proportion of
the screen real-estate, while the rest of the deals which are
1We continue to collect data. The process is made more
difficult as Groupon from time to time changes not only its
page format, but also the URLs required to access infor-
mation on deals. We expect our final release of data will
contain well over 10, 000 deals.
concurrently active are summarized in a smaller sidebar.
The effects of featuring a deal are further amplified by the
daily email Groupon sends to its subscribers directs them
to the webpages associated with their corresponding loca-
tions. To compile this time-series we monitored each deal
in (roughly) ten-minute intervals. Occasionally some of our
requests failed and therefore some gaps are present in our
time-series. As the underlying processes are relatively slow-
moving (for example, deals are almost always featured for
at least one whole day) these gaps have minimal effect on
our analysis.
Finally, we associated each deal with a category. This is
an attribute which we heuristically derived by matching the
description of the each deal against a set of keywords. For
example, deals whose description matched keywords such as
“restaurant,” “food,” “pizza,” etc, were associated with the
“Food & Drink” category. In total we identified eight broad
categories: “Food & Drink”, “Hotels”, “Apparel”, “Home Ap-
pliances”, “Health & Fitness”, “Tickets”, “Classes”, and “Au-
tos”. Deals that remained unmatched by our heuristic were
placed in a special “Other” category.
We remark that our monitoring period overlapped with
the immensely popular nationwide $10 for $20 Barnes & No-
ble gift-card offer which ran from Feb. 4th to Feb. 8th, 2011.
In Los Angeles alone, this deal sold over 21,000 coupons,
while the Los Angeles average deal size was approximately
622. We chose to remove this outlier deal from our dataset
(with the exception of Figure 2.)
2.1 Insights
Figure 2 serves as an overview of the insights we are able
to gain using our dataset. It displays the weekly revenue (in
millions of dollars), as well as the weekly sales of coupons (in
thousands) across all 20 cities we monitored. Notably, one
can see the signs of fast growth associated with Groupon up
to and including the week of January 31. Both sales and
revenue follow an upward trend during this period. Perfor-
mance appears quite different in February, where we observe
an abrupt decline in both revenues and sales. February was
marked by two events that generated significant negative
publicity for Groupon. On February 6th Groupon’s Su-
per Bowl commercials aired, and were found offensive by
many people; Groupon apologized on their official blog and
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Figure 3: Deal size by price (in logarithmic scale.) Black
dots highlight deals in LA; grey dots are used for other cities.
A trend line fitted using OLS regression is also shown.
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Figure 4: Groupon sales and revenue by rank.
pulled the controversial ad campaign [1]. Subsequently, from
February 9th to February 11th, just in time for Valentine’s
day, Groupon offered a nationwide “$20 for $40 Worth of
Flowers” coupon in partnership with FTD Flowers. Shortly
thereafter, customers started realizing that when visiting the
FTD Flowers website via Groupon they were shown much
higher prices for the same products compared to customers
who visited the FTD site directly. Furthermore, coupon pur-
chasers were only allowed to use their coupons on the more
expensive version of the product. The so called offer was
variously perceived as anywhere between a “bait & switch”
scheme and an outright scam; Groupon offered disgruntled
customers refunds2 [3]. The recovery that we observe in
the revenue indicates that this shock had a short-term effect
on Groupon’s growth. Similar short-term effects have been
observed in the time-series of YouTube video views after
exogenous shocks [8].
Entertaining anecdotes aside, using our dataset we are
able to glean various operational insights on and perfor-
mance metrics for Groupon’s business. Figure 4 displays all
deals in our dataset ranked by size and revenue. The axes are
in logarithmic scale. Both deal sizes and deal revenues follow
a power-law-like distribution for much of the distribution,
but the distribution changes for small deals that earned less
than $1K of revenue or had fewer than 100 sales. Looking at
the top 1000 deals we find that 46% of them were featured,
compared to just 17% for the remaining deals. The mix of
other deal attributes is similar with one exception: 46% of
the top 1000 deals come from the “Food & Drink” category,
whereas the corresponding percentage for remaining deals is
only 21%. In future work we plan to examine this distribu-
tion further; we suspect that different social processes may
be affecting the small and large deals.
3. DEAL FEATURES AND INCENTIVES
Groupon has built its business around offering deep dis-
counts. As such one would expect that the discount associ-
ated with a deal would be the primary purchase incentive.
Figure 3 is a scatterplot of deal sizes (coupons sold) vs. deal
2Since we cannot account for these refunds, we note that the
reported sales and revenues of the week starting on February
7 are an overestimate.
prices in logarithmic scale. We observe a large amount of
variance within individual price points. By controlling for
other features we can gain a clearer picture of the trend, as
can be seen by the highlighted data for Los Angeles. Fitting
a trend line on the full data set using ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression provides more perspective on the depen-
dence between price and deal size. While price alone is not
enough to predict deal size, it appears that the logarithm of
price and logarithm of sales are roughly linearly related.
One feature is closely related to the price of a deal: its list
price. The two are displayed side by side. In fact, Groupon
has developed a set of editorial guidelines [2]; deal titles
commonly take on a standard form: “$X for $Y Worth of
Z” (eg, “$10 for $20 Worth of Books at Books Inc.”) As
such one might think that presenting the list price next
to the discounted price might signal how good a bargain
a certain deal is and provide a further purchase incentive
to customers. However, in our dataset approximately three
quarters of all deals are discounted by 40 to 60%. The list
price is highly correlated (0.87) with the discount price and
therefore a weak sales-distinguishing feature once price has
been taken into account.
Approximately 46% of all Groupon deals in our dataset
were scheduled to run for 24 hours. About 32% ran for
two days, 18% for three days, and the remaining few for
four days or more. Figure 5c indicates that while deal size
hardly varies across deals with different durations, revenue
increases for deals that run longer. This may suggest that
Groupon is attempting to hit sales, instead of revenue, tar-
gets. Deals that are more expensive must be allowed more
time to achieve the same sales goal. When we break down
deals by their duration and compute their mean prices we
observe that longer deals are, on average, more expensive:
Duration (days) 1 2 3 4+
Mean price $27 $41 $67 $148
Number of deals 1,731 1,193 680 125
We observe from the distribution of daily sales for multi-day
deals that for two-day deals approximately 65% of total sales
occurred on the first day, while for three-day deals 56% of
total sales occurred on the first day, 22% on the second, and
the remaining on the final day.
At any point in time, and for each geographic market,
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Figure 5: Deal sizes, on the top row, and deal revenues, on the bottom row are shown across the x−axis. On the y−axis deals
are broken down by various deal features. The outer whiskers mark the 5% and 95% quantiles of the deal size and revenue,
the sides of each grey rectangle the 1st and 3rd quartiles, the solid bar the median, and the solid dot the mean.
one deal among the set of all available deals is featured by
Groupon. Featured deals receive prominent placement both
on the Groupon website and the daily email that customers
receive. In our dataset, 75% of all deals were never featured,
24.5% were featured for a single day, and 0.5% were featured
for 2 or 3 days. For simplicity, we therefore treat featuring
as a boolean attribute: a deal was either featured, or not.
The impact of featuring deals is significant: the mean sales
and revenue for featured deals comfortably exceed twice the
corresponding quantities for other deals. The effects of fea-
turing a deal are summarized in the following table:
Featured Non-featured
Mean size 1,310 548
Mean revenue $34,354 $14,277
Number of deals 2,799 930
However, we cannot assume that the effect of featuring a
deal is entirely causal. Groupon has an incentive to feature
those deals that it projects will be most attractive to their
customers. A natural question which follows is whether cer-
tain categories of deals might as whole be more attractive
to customers. Table 1 breaks down deal categories by the
percentage of deals within each that was featured. With the
exception of “Apparel” and “Tickets” deals, there is little
variance across categories in terms of featuring them.
Another distinguishing characteristic of a deal is the in-
ventory size: some deals are available only in limited quanti-
ties, while others have unlimited inventory. Groupon lets its
customers know which deals are limited, but does not dis-
play the number of available units (while some competitors
of Groupon display this prominently). Approximately 29%
of all deals in our dataset are available in limited numbers,
with wide variation across categories. Approximately 44%
of all “Tickets”deals and 77% of all “Hotels”deals were avail-
Featured Non-featured # of deals
Apparel 86% 14% 125
Auto 72% 28% 71
Classes 76% 24% 352
Food & Drink 73% 27% 1,021
Health & Fitness 78% 22% 761
Home Appliances 74% 26% 91
Hotels 77% 23% 70
Other 76% 24% 994
Tickets 66% 34% 244
Table 1: A breakdown of featured deals by category.
able in limited quantities, as one might expect for these types
of deals. Surprisingly, only about 18% of the limited deals
in our dataset sold out. It is not that these deals are intrin-
sically less attractive: limited deals outperformed unlimited
deals on average by 8% more coupon sales and achieving
20% more revenue. Perhaps sellers or Groupon artificially
“limit” deals to apply pressure to customers, making them
more likely to purchase on the spur of the moment.
Groupon also has a choice as to the day(s) of the week that
it schedules each deal to run. Figure 5e breaks down deals
by the day of the week on which they began. Even though
the differences are not striking, it appears deals starting in
the beginning of the week produce less revenue, and deals
starting on Friday produce the most. One possible explana-
tion is that on Fridays Groupon starts more multi-day deals
that span the weekend. For example, 61% of three-day deals
start on a Friday. However, alternative explanations, such
as that the best deals are run on Friday or that people are
more likely to buy on Friday, may also apply.
Deals are said to be “on”when they surpass a sales thresh-
old defined by Groupon, possibly in conjunction with the
merchant. That is, for customers to get a discount, a min-
imum number of them must commit to the deal. Theo-
retically this could yield a group dynamic where customers
encourage their friends to buy a coupon to make it “on.”
However, current deal thresholds are very low. For exam-
ple, in our dataset, the mean threshold to total sales ratio
is approximately 20%. Deals that surpassed their thresh-
old did so on average just after 8am, and only 2% of deals
with thresholds failed to reach them. Like the relationship
between price to deal size, the relationship between thresh-
old and deal size also appears to be linear when plotted in
logarithmic scale (plot omitted for space).
Deals can also be classified by two features that Groupon
does not have direct control over: their geographic market,
and their category. Figure 5a shows that overall deal sizes
appear quite similar over all major cities. One might expect
city population to have a more pronounced effect. However,
New York does not include Long Island, which has a sepa-
rate deal stream; similarly Los Angeles is split into multiple
subareas. As far as deal categories are concerned, Figure 5b
suggests that deals that are the most lucrative in terms of
revenue for Groupon are not the most popular with their cus-
tomers. The most striking example is “Hotels” deals. Even
though on average they produce the fewest sales, they are
also the most profitable. “Food & Drinks” deals prove to be
the most popular, but produce far less revenue.
Finally, it is interesting to note that throughout Figure 5,
we observe heavy-tailed behavior, with the mean being much
larger than the median in essentially all cases.
4. MODELING DEAL OUTCOMES
In the previous section, we considered the soft incentives
available to Groupon (as well as other features), and their
individual relationships with deal size and revenue. We pro-
ceed to consider these characteristics in a unified manner
by considering a regression model. The purpose of this is
twofold: first, it allows us to quantify the dependence of
deal outcomes on the various features we have described;
second, if sufficiently accurate, we could use the model to
predict the outcomes of future deals. (Prediction will be a
major topic in our later paper.) The model we use, noting
that all logarithms are base e, is:
log q = β0 + β1 log p+ β2 log t+ β3d+ β4f + β5l
+ β¯6w + β¯7c+ β¯8g (1)
where q stands for the deal size, p for the coupon price, t for
the threshold, d for whether the deal run for multiple days
or not, f for whether the deal is featured or not, and l for
whether the deal inventory is limited or not. The values of
p and t are centered to their corresponding medians (25 in
both cases.) This allows for a more intuitive interpretation
of the regression’s intercept but does not otherwise affect our
results. The parameters w, c and g are dummy-coded vec-
tors representing the starting day of the week, category, and
city relative to notional reference levels; their corresponding
coefficients are also vectors. Dummy-coding refers to using
binary vectors to encode categorical variables, where a vari-
able that can take on k distinct values is encoded using a
binary vector of length k− 1 where at most one entry is set
to one.
The exact form the model takes upon is motivated by the
observations of Section 3: log p and log q appear to be lin-
Estimate Std. Error Signif.
In
c
e
n
t
iv
e
s (Intercept) 5.32 0.08 ***
log Price -0.47 0.02 ***
log Threshold 0.47 0.02 ***
Multi-day? 0.27 0.04 ***
Featured? 0.81 0.04 ***
Limited? -0.02 0.04
S
t
a
r
t
D
a
y
Mon Reference level
Tue 0.00 0.05
Wed 0.17 0.05 **
Thu 0.19 0.05 ***
Fri 0.20 0.06 ***
Sat 0.03 0.06
Sun -0.04 0.06
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
Other Reference level
Apparel -0.08 0.09
Autos 0.25 0.12 *
Classes -0.16 0.06 **
Food & Drink 0.17 0.05 ***
Health & Fitness 0.02 0.05
Home Appliances -0.05 0.10
Hotels -0.11 0.12
Tickets -0.29 0.07 ***
C
it
y
Atlanta Reference level
Boston 0.21 0.09 *
Chicago 0.48 0.08 ***
Dallas -0.01 0.09
Detroit -0.10 0.10
Houston -0.26 0.10 **
Las Vegas -0.21 0.10 *
Los Angeles 0.13 0.08
Miami -0.37 0.10 ***
New Orleans -0.58 0.13 ***
New York -0.18 0.08 *
Orlando -0.00 0.11
Philadelphia -0.32 0.10 **
San Diego 0.05 0.10
San Francisco 0.38 0.09 ***
San Jose -0.02 0.12
Seattle 0.31 0.09 ***
Tallahassee -0.58 0.16 ***
Vancouver 0.15 0.11
Washington DC 0.34 0.09 ***
F -statistic 79.8 p-value < 2e-16
R-squared 0.45
Significance codes 0% *** 0.1% ** 1% * 5%
Table 2: The regression model of deal sizes on their features.
early related to log q, while the rest of the variables in our
model are either boolean or categorical in nature. Given
the high correlation of the list price to the discounted price
we have chosen to exclude it from the model to avoid intro-
ducing multicollinearity. Also, since most multi-day deals
last for two days, and there is little variance in the number
of sales among multi-day deals, we have chosen to encode
duration as a boolean feature.
We fitted the model using OLS regression. The parameter
estimates, their standard errors, and their significance levels
are shown in Table 2. The intercept of the model is the
unconditional expected mean of the logarithm of the size of
a deal. That is to say the expected mean of the log-size of a
deal in the “Other” category, priced at $25, with a threshold
of 25, not featured, with unlimited inventory, starting on
Monday, and running for a single day in Atlanta is 5.32.
Equivalently, the expected geometric mean of the size of the
same deal is e5.32 ≈ 204.
The coefficient of log p is particularly interesting because
its value is the point-price elasticity of demand for coupons.
To see this, recall that, by definition, the point-elasticity ηp
is given by:
ηp = (∂q/q)/(∂p/p) = ∂ log q/∂ log p = β1. (2)
For deal size, the point-price elasticity given by our regres-
sion model is −0.47. Intuitively, this means that for any 1%
increase in price, we expect a (roughly3) 0.47% decrease in
demand. Since ηp > −1 the demand is said to be inelastic.
This matches our intuition: coupons already represent heavy
discounts and as such neither an increase nor a decrease in
price should severely affect demand.
The coefficients of non-log-transformed variables represent
differences in the expected means of log-sales, and their ex-
ponentiated values represent multiplicative increases (or de-
creases) in the expected geometric mean of sales. For exam-
ple, the expected ratio of the geometric means of sales for
multi-day deals to single-day deals is e0.27 ≈ 1.31. In simple
terms, we could claim that running a deal for more than a
day, we expect a 31% increase in sales. The effect of featur-
ing a deal is, as anticipated, far greater: featured deals are
expected to perform 127% better than their non-featured
counterparts. Limiting a deal, in the presence of all the
other parameters in our model, does not have a statistically
significant effect.
Overall, the F -statistic and the p-value of the model in-
dicate that we can reject the null hypothesis (that there is
no relation between sales and any of the explanatory vari-
ables in our model) with high confidence. However, the R-
squared value of the model suggests only moderate predic-
tive power. Improving the predictive power of the model is
ongoing work.
5. DEAL SCHEDULING
One optimization Groupon has available is managing how
deals are scheduled. Here we examine the data to observe
whether there are noticeable scheduling artifacts demon-
strating active management by Groupon. Of course this
raises the interesting question of how to best schedule deals
to optimize revenue or sales; we do not consider this ques-
tion here, but note that similar problems have been studied
in advertising (e.g., [11, 14]).
As previously alluded to, we note that Groupon does some
scheduling according to the day of the week. For example,
66% of all deals start Monday through Thursday; on Sat-
urdays and Sundays, Groupon initiates approximately 40%
and 50% fewer deals respectively than on Mondays. For an-
other example, in Figure 6, we plot the duration of deals
by the day of the week that they started on. The subplots
show the counts of one-day, two-day, and three-day deals by
their starting day of the week. We observe that Groupon
initiates most one-day deals Monday through Thursday and
most three-day deals on Fridays and weekends.
We also find evidence that deals are scheduled according
to their category; specifically, that Groupon avoids placing
featured deals of the same category back-to-back over con-
secutive days in the same city. This is a natural strategy
to maintain user interest, related to issues of ad fatigue (or
advertising wear out) studied in other contexts [6, 7].
Given the original time-series of featured deals for each
city, for each pair of categories, we count how many times
a deal of category A was followed by a deal of category B.
(As we only consider featured deals, the number of deals
is a small fraction of our total dataset.) We also compute
3The point-price elasticity relates infinitesimal percentage
changes in price to percentage changes in demand. For any
small enough percentage change in price the estimated per-
centage change in sales will be reasonably accurate.
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Figure 6: The number of deals starting on any given day of
the week, broken down by their eventual duration.
Following category
Ap. Au. Cl. Fo. He. Hm. Ht. Ot. Ti.
P
r
e
c
e
d
in
g
Ap. 0/0 0/0 1/ 1 7/ 6 3/ 4 1/1 1/0 3/ 4 1/ 2
Au. 0/0 0/0 4/ 2 6/ 6 2/ 3 1/1 1/0 3/ 5 3/ 2
Cl. 0/1 3/2 4/ 7 32/26 14/14 2/2 1/2 20/21 8/ 7
Fo. 9/6 7/6 27/26 57/86 62/47 4/7 5/5 75/68 26/24
He. 6/4 4/3 15/14 60/48 17/29 6/4 4/2 38/43 14/14
Hm. 0/0 0/1 1/ 2 6/ 7 9/ 4 1/0 0/0 6/ 6 0/ 2
Ht. 0/0 2/0 1/ 2 6/ 5 2/ 3 1/0 0/0 3/ 4 1/ 1
Ot. 2/4 3/5 18/21 70/67 42/44 6/6 2/4 67/62 24/21
Ti. 1/2 0/2 11/ 7 29/24 12/14 1/2 2/1 22/21 2/ 7
Table 3: The observed/expected number of times one fea-
tured category follows another.
the average value of this quantity by randomly permuting
the time-series 1,000 times. Table 3 summarizes the exper-
iment. For each pair of categories we show the observed
number of occurrences of that event followed by the av-
erage number of occurrences (to the nearest integer). For
example, the entry 29/24 of preceding category “Ti.” and
following category “Fo.” indicates that a featured deal of
category “Tickets” was followed by a featured deal of cat-
egory “Food” 29 times in our data, while if the same deals
had been scheduled randomly, we would expect this event to
happen 24 times. Deviations from the random experiment
are generally small, except for the diagonal of this matrix,
which indicates that Groupon consistently avoids featuring
the same category back-to-back. The observation holds for
all categories except for the“Other”category, which contains
all deals that do not fit in any of our broad categories.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Our work to date has characterized customer purchases of
daily deals offered by Groupon, and has investigated rela-
tionships between price, other key deal attributes, and deal
size. One key outcome of our modeling work is preliminary
evidence that Groupon is behaving strategically to optimize
deal offerings, giving customers“soft” incentives to purchase.
One specific line of our future work regards the predictabil-
ity of deal sizes. How early in the day can we obtain strong
predictions of the final deal size based on sales thus far and
our time-series data, and how does this compare with our
zero hour prediction? Another line examines the interplay
between social networks and deal purchases. To what extent
does sharing of information through social networks increase
Groupon sales, and do existing propagation models, such as
the Independent Cascade model [13], apply?
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